The term “zombie mortgage” has recently gained notoriety as long-silent mortgage servicers have surfaced to attempt to collect old (or even ancient) second mortgages, many of which date back to the recession of the late 2000s. With many of the thousands of these zombie mortgages, borrowers have not received statements or any correspondence for years during which time interest has continued to accrue. A second mortgage that may have been $25,000 in 2009 might have a balance two or three times that amount some 15 years later in 2024, and where residential properties may have had little to no equity in the 2000s or early 2010s, those same properties have increased significantly in value – the perfect scenario for a second mortgage holder to foreclose.

If this sounds unfair or even illegal, it might be.

The Massachusetts Attorney General recently announced an unprecedented settlement with a mortgage servicer that was attempting to collect loans secured by zombie mortgages. The Attorney General alleged that the servicer, Franklin Credit Management Corporation, had failed to comply with numerous state and federal mortgage and debt collection regulations, all in violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (G.L. c. 93A). According to the filings, Franklin Credit is prohibited from collecting anything from the 518 accounts that it was servicing (totaling roughly $10,000,000) and is further prohibited from transferring or selling the loans. In short, the loans are uncollectable and the mortgages will be discharged.

This is promising news for others who may be experiencing something similar. Although this is still very much a developing area, there may be options available to attempt to address a zombie mortgage or a threatened foreclosure. If you are one of the thousands of borrowers who have been affected, contact us to discuss those options.

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Automatic Homestead: All homeowners receive an automatic homestead exemption of $125,000 even if they have not recorded a declaration of homestead.

Declared Homestead: All homeowners who have recorded a declaration of homestead now receive an exemption of $1,000,000.

Elderly or Disabled: All homeowners who are over the age of 62 or who are disabled receive an exemption of $1,000,000. This exemption is doubled for a married couple who are co-owners ($1,000,000 each).

The Homestead Act is complicated. There are limited protections for dependents who live in the home. There are special protections for divorcing homeowners. There are limitations to the exemption for certain types of debts. It also has specific application and some possible limitations when asserted in connection with a bankruptcy case. It’s important to consult an attorney to understand the extent of the protection available to you before you record a declaration of homestead.

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While this appeal did not involve any novel issues, it did involve a smattering of bedrock trial topics such as standing, evidence (hearsay), claims in bankruptcy, evidentiary burdens of persuasion, default judgments, document admissibility and witness testimony.   The case also dealt with legal issues such as the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, M.G.L. 93A, Excusable Neglect, Insurance placement, Declaratory Judgment and the trial court’s discretion concerning certain, case deadlines and trial procedures.

Appellant raises six arguments on appeal. She argues the Bankruptcy Court erred by: (1) failing to extend Appellant’s discovery deadline; (2) allowing Appellees’ witness to testify following a review of documents outside of court; (3) finding that Christiana had standing to enforce the Note against Appellant; (4) depriving her of a fair hearing on the merits based on certain statements made by the Bankruptcy Court during the trial; (5) finding that Appellant had not met her burden of proving that she had obtained homeowner’s insurance; and (6) failing to enter a declaratory judgment against the DCM and Urban under Count IV.

When a district court reviews a decision of a Bankruptcy Court, it applies a clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact, de novo review to conclusions of law, and abuse of discretion review to discretionary rulings.  See In re López-Muñoz, 983 F.3d 69,71 (1st Cir. 2020). “A [factual] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re IDC Clambakes, Inc., 727 F.3d 58, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2003). Moreover, “[m]ixed questions of law and fact invoke a sliding standard of review,” whereby “[t]he more fact intensive the question, the more deferential the level of review . . . [and] the more law intensive the question, the less deferential the level of review.” Id. at 64.

Among other rulings in the case, the Court found that the testimony of the appellee’s witness, who was called by Amann & Burnett, was properly allowed and admissible, despite the appellant’s objection.  The standard of review applied to a bankruptcy court’s evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. Williams v. Drake, 146 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 1998). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602; see Fed. R. Bank. P. 9017 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply). Evidence that a witness has personal knowledge may come in the form of that witness’s own testimony. Id. “Evidence is inadmissible under Rule 602 ‘only if in the proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion it finds that the witness could not have actually perceived or observed that which he testified to.’” United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1206 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1988)).

Read the full decision by clicking on the link below and please do not hesitate to contact Amann Burnett, PLLC for any questions or issues you might have related to complex bankruptcy, commercial litigation, trials and Federal Court appeals.

In re Watkinson Decision on Appeal

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The term “avoid” is a bankruptcy term of art akin to “reverse” or “undo” in layman’s terms. Certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code permit a trustee or, in some circumstances, a debtor, to avoid transfers of money or property that occurred before the bankruptcy case was filed. A foreclosure auction is a transfer for bankruptcy purposes. Since at least the decision in In re Mularski, 565 B.R. 203 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2017), many Chapter 13 debtors have been successful in avoiding a foreclosure sale under specific sections of the Bankruptcy Code when the bankruptcy case is filed after the sale takes place, but before the foreclosure deed is recorded.

The legal mechanics to avoid of a pre-petition foreclosure are briefly described as follows.

Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(3) states:

(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by— … (3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.

Bankruptcy Code § 522(h) states:

(h) The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a setoff to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer, if— (1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title or recoverable by the trustee under section 553 of this title; and (2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.

Put simply, these two statutes state that a bankruptcy debtor may avoid a pre-petition transfer if the trustee does not elect to do so, as long as the transfer was not perfected under state law prior to the bankruptcy case and there was no notice of the transfer to potential bona fide purchasers prior to the bankruptcy case (note that both perfection and notice must be lacking). The debtor must also comply with § 522(g)(1), which states that the transfer must not have been voluntary, was not concealed, and the property that was transferred would have been part of the bankruptcy estate when the case was filed and exempt from claims of creditors if the transfer had not occurred.

In this case, Tran v. Citizens Bank, the lender conducted a mortgage foreclosure sale of the debtor’s home on August 16, 2022. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case 28 days later on September 13, 2022 and initiated an adversary proceeding to avoid the foreclosure sale. Before the bankruptcy case was filed, however, the lender recorded a foreclosure deed and other documents required by Massachusetts foreclosure law, including an Affidavit of Sale. The deed apparently lacked proper notarization and the debtor argued that such a defect rendered the deed ineffective to perfect the transfer and convey the property to the buyer, and in the absence of a proper deed, the recording of the Affidavit of Sale alone was insufficient to give constructive notice to third-parties that the debtor’s interest in the property had been transferred. Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court held that the recording of the Affidavit of Sale before the bankruptcy case was sufficient notice to third parties under state law because Massachusetts is a “notice” jurisdiction, therefore when the Affidavit of Sale was recorded, it acted as “notice to the world” – including any potential bona fide purchasers – that the foreclosure had taken place. Finding that there was notice of the pre-petition transfer sufficient to defeat avoidance under § 544, the Court did not arrive at any conclusion as to whether the transfer was perfected.

As of the date of this article, the Debtor has filed a notice of appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

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Opinion Date: October 12, 2023

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use      Petitioners James Beal, Mary Beth Brady, Mark Brighton, Lenore Weiss Bronson, Nancy Brown, William R. Castle, Lawrence J. Cataldo, Ramona Charland, Lucinda Clarke, Fintan Connell, Marjorie P. Crean, Ilara Donarum, Joseph R. Famularo, Jr., Philippe Favet, Charlotte Gindele, Julia Gindele, Linda Griebsch, Catherine L. Harris, Roy W. Helsel, John E. Howard, Nancy B. Howard, Elizabeth Jefferson, Cate Jones, Robert McElwain, Mary Lou McElwain, Edward Rice, April Weeks, Michael Wierbonics, and Lili Wierbonics, appealed a Housing Appeals Board (HAB) order that reversed a decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which, in turn, had reversed certain approvals granted by the Portsmouth Planning Board (Planning Board) to respondent, Iron Horse Properties, LLC (Iron Horse).

Iron Horse owned real property at 105 Bartlett Street in Portsmouth.  In 2021, it requested various approvals from the Planning Board in connection with its proposed redevelopment of the site: three multi-family apartment buildings with a total of 152 dwelling units.  Iron Horse sought a site review permit, lot line revision permit, conditional use permit (CUP) for shared parking and a wetland CUP.   The Planning Board granted the approvals and the petitioners, describing themselves as “a group of abutters and other concerned citizens,” then filed an appeal with the ZBA.  The ZBA granted the appeal, effectively reversing the Planning Board’s site plan and CUP approvals.

Following denial of its motion for rehearing, Iron Horse then appealed the ZBA’s decision to the HAB.  The HAB reversed the ZBA’s findings as to six of the petitioners’ claims and dismissed the remaining three claims.  Petitioners took their appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, raising a number of issues that were consolidated under two overarching questions:

(1) whether Iron Horse’s proposed project met the six criteria for a wetland CUP set forth in section 10.1017.50 of the Portsmouth Zoning Ordinance; and

(2) whether Iron Horse’s permit requests were barred under the doctrine of Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980).   Finding no reversible error in the HAB’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. https://amburlaw.com/practice-areas/real-estate-law/)

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sale agreement that contemplated the assignment of debtor’s right to purchase land and certain access rights; finding that, under New Hampshire law, economic loss doctrine barred claim

for damages for negligent misrepresentation claim; and finding that liquidated damages clause in purchase and sale agreement was not enforceable).  Turning to the issue of the liquidated

damages clause, the parties agree, and the P&S Agreement contemplated, at least in part, a real estate transaction (the sale of the Land and accesses rights), but is silent on how the property

would be developed. However, here the real estate transaction was between Ritchie Bros. and the Cross-Defendants, not the Cross-Claimants and the Cross-Defendants. After construing the

P&S Agreement in the context of the CrossClaimants’ and Cross-Defendant’s business relationship and in reference to the Ritchie Agreement, the Court finds that the P&S Agreement is

more properly characterized as an assignment of the right to purchase Land and certain development rights attached to the Land, as opposed to a traditional sale of real estate. Based on

the testimony given at trial and the evidence admitted into evidence, the Court does not believe that projected damages from a breach of the P&S Agreement were difficult to prove as

required to satisfy the first prong of the three-prong test used to evaluate the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses under New Hampshire law.

Here, the record shows that NH  Highway was supposed to receive $400,000 for the sale of its right to purchase the Land and the related rights, and a 15% equity position in the company

(and thus, the Land, and any  revenue generated from the monetization of the Land and related rights).   Turning to the third prong, the Court finds that the reduction of the Cross-

Claimants’ foreseeable damages to the  $30,000 deposit would be unreasonable and grossly disproportionate to the actual damages sustained, given the actual damages analysis considered

herein.

Accordingly, the Court  concludes that the liquidated damages clause is not enforceable. In so concluding, the Court notes that Lopes did not offer any evidence into the record supporting

his position that the damages were difficult to ascertain or otherwise challenge the Cross-Claimants’ analysis of the liquidated damages clause and applicable law.

Under New Hampshire law, courts recognize a distinction between a valid liquidated damages clauses in contracts and what amounts to an unenforceable penalty. “In a valid [and

enforceable liquidation] clause: (1) the damages anticipated as a result of the breach are uncertain in amount or difficult to prove; (2) the parties intended to liquidate damages in advance;

and (3) the amount agreed upon is reasonable and not greatly disproportionate to the presumable loss or injury.”  Holloway Automotive, 163 N.H. at 9-10, 35 A.3d at 581 (citing Orr, 157

N.H. at 514, 953 A.2d at 1193).  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has “concluded that ‘[i]n real estate transactions, projected damages from a breach are difficult to forecast because

land values fluctuate.”  C & M Realty Tr., 133 N.H. at 478, 578 A.2d at 359 (quoting Bower v. Davis & Symonds Lumber Co., 119 N.H. 605, 609, 406 A.2d 119, 122 (1979) and citing

Realco Equities, Inc. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 N.H. 345, 351, 540 A.2d 1220, 1224 (1988) (widely recognized that damages resulting from failed real estate deal

difficult to prove)).

https://amburlaw.com/practice-areas/real-estate-law/

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The debtor must elect to be treated as a SARE by checking the appropriate box on the official Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (Official Bankruptcy Form B 201).  However, be careful!  There are consequences which flow from declaring oneself a SARE.  For example, timelines start once such an election is made and remember that monthly operating reports will soon become due.  See, Andover Covered Bridge, LLC v. Harrington (In re Andover Covered Bridge, LLC), 553 B.R. 162 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).

If the debtor does not elect to declare itself as a SARE debtor on the petition, a secured creditor may file a motion with the bankruptcy court under section 101(51B) of the Bankruptcy Code to designate the debtor as a SARE debtor.  This motion can be filed as a standalone motion or as alternative relief to a larger motion for relief from a stay or to dismiss the case.  Because of specific timing restrictions on a SARE debtor to file a plan of reorganization or make interest payments to a lender, secured lenders should file this motion as soon as practicable after the petition date so that the clock can start running on a SARE debtor’s time limits if the lender’s motion is approved.

The definition of SARE in the Bankruptcy Code governs a debtor’s eligibility to qualify as a SARE Chapter 11 case.  There are three (3) elements to the definition that must all be met and each are commonly litigated.

• The real property must constitute a single property or a project. The first frequently litigated factor is whether the property owned by the debtor is a “single property or project, other than residential real property with fewer than four (4) residential units.”  See 101(51B.  While determining whether a debtor operates a single property is generally straight forward, it is less clear whether the debtor’s business is a single project. The generally accepted test for determining whether a property consisting of multiple parcels is a single project focuses on the debtor’s intent or purpose (see In re JJMM Int’l Corp., 467 B.R. 275 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2012)). Courts focus on how the debtor treats its property and hold that the SARE provisions can apply to a debtor with multiple properties where the properties are linked together in some fashion in a common plan or scheme involving their use (see In re McGreals, 201 B.R. 736, 742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996)).  Courts have found multiple parcels of land constituting a single project when:
• The debtor owned several apartment buildings on adjacent parcels. The separate buildings constituted an apartment complex comprised of a single project because the debtor had a common plan or purpose for the property, see In re Vargas Realty Enter. Inc., 2009 WL 2929258, at *4-5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009)).
• Five (5) adjacent undeveloped parcels were considered a single project even though the debtor planned to construct a hotel, golf courses, convention center, spa and related services on the property, because the debtor planned to develop them as one large resort. See In re Webb MTN, LLC, 2008 WL 656271, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2008).

2. The real property must generate substantially all of the debtor’s gross income.

The requirement that the debtor’s real estate must generate the substantial portion of its gross income is typically satisfied when the debtor’s primary source of income is the sale, rental, or operation of real property.  However, “a business would not be a SARE if a reasonable and prudent businessperson would expect to generate substantial revenues from the operation of activities separate and apart from the sale or lease of the underlying real estate.”  In re Scotia Pacific Co., LLC, 508 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2007).

To make the determination, courts examine the relative income generated by the real property compared with the income generated by other operations related to the real property.  Courts specifically look to the material nature of the business activities and whether the revenues the property owner receives are passive in nature, such as the simple collection of rents.  See In re Kara Homes, Inc., 363 B.R. 399 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).

3. The debtor must not be involved in any substantial business other than the operation of the real property.

If the debtor is operating a business that is generating income independent or ancillary to the ownership of the real estate, the other business, if significant, is not considered incidental to the business of operating the real property and therefore the debtor does not qualify as a SARE.

Of the three elements of the SARE definition, this one is most commonly litigated.  Courts have analyzed whether certain businesses and operations qualify as a SARE and have determined that the following businesses do not qualify as SARE debtors when they are engaged in other substantial business:

• A hotel is not a SARE debtor when it operates significant other businesses, including a restaurant, bar, and gift shop, and provides room cleaning services and phone services for its guests (see Centofante v. CBJ Dev., Inc. (In re CBJ Dev., Inc.), 202 B.R. 467 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996); In re Whispering Pines Estate, Inc., 341 B.R. 134 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006).
• Golf courses. A golf course is not a SARE debtor when it also offers golf cart rentals, a pool, and concessions (see, In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc. d/b/a Uwharrie Gold Club, 219 B.R. 391 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997)) or when it is connected to residential land developments and not simply operating the gold course (see, In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, Inc., 255 B.R. at 228 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000); See Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Perry Hollow Golf Club, Inc. (In re Perry Hollow Mgmt. Co., Inc.), 2000 BNH 013, at 3; Banc of Am. Commercial Fin. Corp. v. CGE Shattuck, LLC (In re CGE Shattuck, LLC), 1999 BNH 046, at 12-13.
• A marina is not a SARE when, in addition to providing for the mooring of boats, the marina also stores, repairs, and winterizes boats, as well as sells gas concessions (see In re Khemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995)).
• A timber company owning about 200,000 acres of timberland is not a SARE because it was engaged in the business of harvesting timber and conducted other substantial business aside from the operation of real estate (see, In re Scotia Pacific Co., LLC, 508 F.3d at 224-225).

In a typical real estate structure that contains a parent company, subsidiaries and affiliates with consolidated operations and shared operating accounts, if one of the subsidiaries qualifies as a SARE under the plain language of section 101(51B) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court must designate that entity a SARE and treat it that way during the bankruptcy case even if the other debtor entities are not SAREs.

While section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code expedites the plan process and drives the debtor to file a plan sooner than it would in a non-SARE case, the expedited timing requirements in section 363(d)(3) are not triggered until either the:

• Debtor designates itself as a SARE on the petition or by motion.
• Secured creditor files a motion seeking a determination from the bankruptcy court that the debtor is a SARE entity.

Debtors in need of the extra time to file a plan or begin monthly payments should consider the time requirements and alter their strategies accordingly.  Because many debtors will want as long as possible to file a plan or begin making monthly payments, a debtor may choose not to classify itself as a SARE debtor on its own and wait for the debtor’s creditors or lenders to make a motion to designate.

Until there is a finding that the debtor is a SARE debtor, the time limits in section 362(d)(3) do not begin or expire (see In re Abdulla, 2009 WL 348365 (Bankr. D. Mass Feb. 6, 2009)). Therefore, if it is unclear to the debtor when completing the petition whether it meets the definition of SARE, it may be more appropriate for the debtor not to designate itself as a SARE. That will also offer more time for the debtor to benefit from the automatic stay while the SARE designation is later litigated with the secured creditor.

Lenders must be aware of a debtor’s strategy to delay designation and protect their rights.  When preparing to file for Chapter 11, a SARE debtor should try to conserve cash.  The cash preserved before filing can be used to make payments to the secured creditor at the loan’s contract nondefault rate. Alternatively, if a debtor’s property generates revenues or it obtained financing from a third party, it can use those funds to make interest payments to the secured lender.

When a debtor cannot make interest payments because it does not have enough revenue or financing, it can achieve additional time in bankruptcy by filing a plan.  The requirement that a SARE debtor file a plan that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed or risk lifting the automatic stay in favor of the secured lender is a less stringent standard than in other contexts of the Bankruptcy Code (§ 1112(b)(2)(A). The SARE debtor does not need to demonstrate that its plan will actually be confirmed and is not required to present the same level of evidence that is required at a confirmation hearing. It must produce enough evidence at a hearing to lift the automatic stay that there is a reasonable possibility to confirm the plan in a reasonable period of time.  See, In re Bonner Mall P’ship, 2 F. 3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Trigee Found., Inc., 2013 WL 1401889 (Bankr. D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2013)).

https://amburlaw.com/practice-areas/real-bankruptcy)

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The bankruptcy court ultimately granted Minkina’s motion to avoid.  It once again rejected the Snyder approach, reiterating that — contrary to RPS’s assertions and the B.A.P.’s reasoning — Massachusetts law, and particularly the Supreme Judicial Court’s (“SJC”) decision in Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav. Bank, 415 Mass. 145 (1993), did not compel the conclusion that a spouse’s share in a tenancy by the entirety had to equal the full value of the property.  In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 551-55.  The court consequently accepted the parties’ stipulation that Minkina’s share in the property was worth no more than $525,000, and separately rejected RPS’s arguments that the other liens and homestead exemption needed to be allocated between the spouses.  Id. at 548, 556, 558-59.  Given these conclusions, Minkina could avoid the judicial lien in its entirety under the § 522(f) formula.  Id. at 559.  The court permitted a direct appeal of the bankruptcy court’s
interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), and this appeal followed.

Minkina has the better of the argument.  The fact that a Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety constitutes a “unitary title” plainly does not compel the conclusion that an individual spouse’s interest in the tenancy must be valued at the fair market value of the entire property in question.  Moreover, the Snyder approach impermissibly departed from Congress’s explicit instructions to value the debtor’s interest in the property absent any liens as the fair market value thereof for the purposes of the § 522(f) formula.  Read the full opinion, click the link below.

In re Minkina 1st Cir. BAP 522f lien avoidance

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Degiacomo vs. sacred heart in re Palladino 548 clawback

Traverse 548

I’ve been lecturing for the National Business Institute on legal topics for over fifteen (15) years.  So, it came as no surprise when Kim Rudy at NBI contacted me and asked if I could stand in as a substitute presenter and deliver a ninety (90) minute lecture; apparently the original presenter could not make it on the 17th.  Sure, no problem, I said.  The materials would be sent to me and all I had to do was present the already completed materials.  Usually doing a presentation requires drafting the lecture materials from scratch, conducting hours of research and putting it all into Power Point and making sure all the materials are coherent, up to date and flow for a smooth presentation.  In this case, I was just going to be a substitute teacher of sorts.

Well…after presenting all the materials (see Fraudulent Transfer power point slides NBI August 17, 2023) above, the producer chimed into the live audience presentation and said, “Attorney Amann, you have another forty (40) minutes to go.”  Since I can’t tap dance and my singing and joke telling skills are sub-par, I needed to keep going.  Fortunately, even though I was just asked to present the materials prepared for me, I am naturally curious and I took some time before the lecture to review my notes and files to jog my memory about the topic, which was Fraudulent Transfers.

I wound up discussing two (2) cases, the links to which are both above.  The Sacred Heart case was an example of a successful 11 USC 548 action.  The Traverse case was an example of how the Debtor vanquished the Chapter 7 Trustee and defeated his 548 and 551 approaches.   After the lecture, I realized that it was a really good thing that I had to slow down and revisit these cases (both still good law).  Sure, I had to scramble just a bit but focusing on the cases and analyzing them in greater detail than I had expected yielded, I think, a more natural and hopefully better lecture.  I thank Attorney Gregory P. Bailey of Margulis Gelfand, LLC in St. Louis for putting together the Power Point materials on the Uniform Voidable Transaction Act (f/k/a Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act or UFTA); they were well organized and helped tremendously.  As always, I thank NBI for the opportunity to present and discuss on legal topics near and dear to Amann Burnett’s practice.   Our practice focuses on Commercial litigation, Business Bankruptcy and Bankruptcy Litigation and Land Use.  We handle cases in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connecticut and have been admitted as pro hac counsel in Maine Bankruptcy Court, Rhode Island Bankruptcy Court and Federal Court for the Southern District of New York.

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